




Starting from the premise that the financial regime has become a 
power in and of itself—a fourth, ‘monetative’ power as it were—this 
essay gives an account of the ascendancy of finance and the shift 
from geopolitical to geo-economical order, within which there is no 
democratic legitimacy and no legal accountability and within which 
a new class conflict also emerges. It goes on to advance five theses 
on this new financial sovereignty, concluding that sovereign is he, 
who can transform his risks into other’s dangers and position him-
self as the creditor of last resort.
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Modernity has given rise not merely to the sovereign state 
apparatus, to international trade companies, to influential 
financiers, to decentralized markets. It has also witnessed the 
formation of a particular type of power—the financial regime—
that cannot be properly described in terms either of political 
structures or of economic strategies. This type of power is 
constituted, instead, by the interpenetration of these poles. 
From the integration of private creditors into the politics of 
early modern states, to the creation of central banks and public 
credit, all the way up to today’s capitalism of financial markets, 
we can trace the emergence of a type of ‘economic governance’ 
that ultimately has immunized itself against the democratization 
of political power. We find ourselves in a situation in which, 
above all, the financial regime has taken on the character of a 
‘fourth power’ and the accumulation of capital power is intimately 
associated with the deployment of power capital. Insofar as 
crises are intellectual windfalls, driving forces out of latency 
that, under normal conditions, remain inconspicuous, the last 
financial and economic crisis offered an apt illustration: in it a 
style of government could be observed that merits the title of a 
‘coup d’état’.
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This means two things. On the one hand, from 2008 to current 
Euro policy, we have been dealing with decision-making bodies 
consisting of state representatives, international organizations 
and private companies, which have joined together in informal 
committees, operating outside the legal framework, to represent 
the interests of creditors. One particular example has been 
provided by the so-called Eurogroup, which directly dictates the 
fate of European debtor countries. In response to the question, 
on what legal basis they intended to enforce their decisions 
against resistance by individual members, the secretary of the 
Eurogroup retorted: “the Eurogroup does not exist in law […]. It 
is an informal group […] of the eurozone member states. Thus 
there are no written rules about the way it conducts its business, 
and therefore its president is not legally bound.”1
On the other hand, the measures taken have manifested 
themselves as quasi-sovereign acts. In the Eurogroup, but also 
the European Stability Mechanism and the Fiscal Pact, legislative 
procedures were circumvented, creating a secondary structure 
without legal formalization, which acted as a transnational 
executive, suspending budgetary powers, intervening in tax law, 
social policy, labor law, and so on. The results are well known: 
In Greece, for example, economic output collapsed by 28%, 
unemployment rose to 27%, youth unemployment to 65%, and 
average wages fell by nearly a quarter.
What is going on here? How could such an ostentatious alliance 
between finance capital and government power come about? How 
did this fusion of informal consortia, sovereign competencies 
and transnational executive authority emerge? What components 
comprise the current financial regime? 
To begin with, it was formed through a process that has, 
for some time now, been referred to as ‘financialization’. Its 
beginnings reach back to the 1970s and are characterized by a 
confluence of disparate actions and events. A first condition was 
the collapse of the Bretton Woods Agreement in the early ’70s, 
leading to floating exchange rates, new financial instruments (like 
currency derivatives) and expanding financial markets. Then came 
the so-called ‘Volcker shock’, when the Federal Reserve under 
Paul Volcker drastically increased the fed funds rate, redirecting 
profits from surplus countries (like Japan and Germany) to Wall 
Street, while at the same time forcing a fall in wage costs. This 
was supplemented by liberal economic reforms under Thatcher 
and Reagan: deregulation of financial markets, tax privileges 
for interest-bearing assets, and privatization of social security 
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systems. In addition to further interventions which allowed 
finance capital to break out of its containment by the welfare state 
(reduction of corporate taxes, reform of labor markets, financial 
market promotion laws), two additional components came into 
play.
On the one hand, a new and dominant role for international 
organizations and treaties in the financial world—as was most 
evident in the role of the IMF. Since the 1970s the IMF had 
been given a very special field of activity, namely monitoring 
adherence to ‘stability criteria’ in the face of floating exchange 
rates. The heyday of ‘structural adjustment programs’ had begun: 
granting loans to developing and emerging countries subject to 
strict conditions, including budgetary discipline, tax reform, 
privatization of state-owned enterprises, investor protection, 
liberalization of capital markets, and facilitation of foreign 
investment.
On the other hand, a reorientation of central banks was 
undertaken—as can be seen in particular in the founding of 
the ECB. The ECB considers itself to be the guarantor of the 
financial and monetary system: it provides services to banks and 
financial markets, while operating as an independent enclave of 
governance, immune from other governmental bodies. And its 
orientation is therefore conspicuously one-sided: While it is no 
way accountable to European parliaments and governments, it 
answers to the financial public. It is obligated to those investors 
and actors who dictate the dynamics of financial markets to 
safeguard currency and monetary value. In other words, the ECB 
offers a kind of ‘minority protection’ to the representatives of the 
financial sector; through central banks, financial markets have 
become an integral part of governmental practice and manifest 
themselves as para-democratic.
This picture certainly does not capture all the elements of 
the current financial regime (for instance, e-commerce, shadow 
banks, and the dominant economic doctrines should not be 
forgotten). But, of course, it raises the question: What are the 
characteristics of the financial regime, past and present? What 
kind of governance does it represent? What kind of power? Let 
me just formulate a few theses concerning the present situation.
First. The ascendancy of finance is due to an intense interplay 
between public and private agencies and cannot be described by 
the opposition of the state and the markets. Here, the antagonism 
of state and capital is weak or absent altogether. The financial 
regime must be defined as a special kind of modern power, as 
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a special technology in the execution of modern power, modern 
government: that is the conversion of state power into capital 
(and vice versa), which guarantees perpetual scenes of primitive 
accumulation. This has led to a movement as powerful as it is 
ambiguous. Just as the modern state secured its permanence 
through the perpetuation of public debt and taxation, so the 
financial regime obtained a quasi-sovereign power in fiscal 
affairs. At the same time, through a permanent state of emergency 
(that is, a permanent dependence from private financiers and 
creditors), this power evaded sovereign intervention and later 
obtained institutional form in national, central and note issuing 
banks. This indicates the precarious status of the financial 
regime. In it, the alienation or privatization of state resources 
comes up against the political occupation of private finance. It 
is this two-way public-private interplay that gives the financial 
regime its special status. On the fiscal side, this regime claims 
arcane components and sovereign dignity; as the embodiment 
of private capital, on the other hand, it resists acts of arbitrary 
political power. The formation of the sovereign state unleashed, 
together with private business, a dynamic which manifests itself 
in an eccentric becoming-sovereign of the financial regime. With 
finance, a reserve of sovereignty forming a category of its own 
established itself alongside and apart from state authority.
Second. When we speak today of the financial system, we 
are not referring to a purely economic matter, a special market 
system. The present financial system is rather a conglomerate of 
government bodies, central banks, international organizations 
(IMF), and privileged private corporations (investment groups, 
rating agencies), an ensemble of public, semi-private, and private 
actors. One could speak here of ‘regulatory capitalism’2 and of 
a transnational, trans-governmental executive, which is to say: 
of a power that makes and implements political decisions, which 
intervene directly in national economies and in the politics 
of traditional nation states. As a power of its own kind, the 
financial regime structures a global space in which sovereign 
competencies, business, and market mechanisms are converging. 
This characterizes a shift from geopolitical to geo-economical 
order which distributes areas of exploitation and zones of 
accumulation, establishing a new class conflict: mobile investors, 
or super-citizens, against earthbound sub-citizens.
Third. In the history of finance, essential ruptures are not 
marked by the ‘resounding’ events of recent crises. Rather, the 
historic break took place in the seventies when secular trends 
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reversed. Up to this date, progressive taxation, solidary social 
insurance, and strong trade unions fought for a continuous 
reduction of inequalities in the distribution of revenues and assets. 
Financialization reversed these dynamics and caused a situation 
in which a maximum of private fortune confronts a maximum of 
private (and public) debt.3 Two aspects are noteworthy. On the one 
hand, an increasing portion of profits and credit was invested in 
financial products causing an offensive deindustrialization (e.g. 
in the UK and the USA), a movement which is reinforced in present 
platform capitalism, creating high market values for companies 
that are increasingly unburdened by liabilities against fixed 
capital and labor. On the other hand, the financial regime installs 
a transfer system which turns the lower part of the population 
into payers of net interest in favor of finance capital. This process 
was accompanied by the passive inclusion of wage earners in the 
financial economy: expansion of consumer credits, mortgages, 
privatization of social security. One could observe one of the 
results in the Euro crisis: The weakest countries and groups had to 
bear the costs of the crisis—an internal colonization of European 
populations. The dynamic of finance not only released centrifugal 
forces in politics and economy; it also eroded social milieus of 
solidarity—one of the most important resources of democracy.
Fourth. This raises a related problem which has already 
become a major preoccupation for economists today: namely, 
the devolution of the monopoly on regulating liquidity from 
states and central banks to financial markets themselves. We are 
witnessing a transition here from a financial system regulated by 
governments to a system of financial governance regulated by 
markets. This has two consequences. For one thing, central banks 
are increasingly losing control of interest rates and the money 
supply in circulation. Money creation now happens in the market 
itself; even the vast quantities of cheap money injected into the 
economy by the ECB have barely been able to counter deflationary 
tendencies in recent years. For another thing, financial markets 
have become a ‘prison’ for governments, states, and societies. 
This has become particularly apparent in the policies of the ECB: 
the ECB is subject to a rule blocking it from purchasing bonds 
directly from the European member states; government bonds 
can only be purchased indirectly, through markets. That’s why 
states are now evaluated by these markets, setting up a kind of 
reputation or beauty contest among them. An automatic profit-
generating mechanism has been set up: the ECB supplies private 
banks with cheap money, which they pass on to governments at 
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higher interest rates. Using the threat of capital flight, interest 
rate disadvantages and reduced investment, financial markets 
have thus become a fourth power (we can call it ‘monetative’—
besides legislative, executive, judiciary powers4), a creditor of last 
resort.
Fifth. All this gives rise to a double dilemma. According to 
the prevailing dogma, economic growth can be financed by 
low interest rates and cheap money (this has been the ECB’s 
strategy, also the Fed’s, for years; zero-interest rate policy 
(ZIRP), quantitative easing). But this very policy leads to the 
accumulation of future risk potentials: cheap money is less likely 
to be invested in industry and infrastructures, and more likely 
to flow into capital and real estate markets. The symptoms are 
already on the horizon: stock market booms, explosive real 
estate prices. So the very effort to generate economic growth 
summons the next financial crisis. But there is also the shadow 
of a political dilemma; a dilemma concerning the scope available 
for political decision-making. The depolitization of monetary 
politics (now dominated by the financial markets) is accompanied 
by the privilege of the financial industry, which may determine 
the distribution of wealth by money creation and the very special 
structures of financing. The anticipation of market preferences 
dictates the direction of political decisions. The concern of the 
democratic voting public is limited by the concern of a powerful 
minority, the financial public. This political and social cleavage 
will undoubtedly continue to occupy and afflict us. One might say, 
in fact, that the financial public today is pitted in class struggle 
against the entire rest of the population.
This inevitably raises older questions of sovereignty. Although 
we must come to terms with a global situation in which sovereign 
authority today can be exercised only in a restricted, distributed 
and fragmented way, some questions persist. In such a situation, 
we should first of all be wary of false friends, who offer answers 
to questions which they are not able to pose. One figure is posed 
by liberalism, which, by pointing out the blessings of a market 
order, systematically overlooks the concrete power relations of 
the financial regime. The other false hope is that placed in the old 
nation-state. For in addition to the essential role this entity has 
played in the creation of the current financial order, it is already 
in the process of concluding the most aggressive of alliances, one 
currently being tested in the USA: the alliance of the financial 
industry and plutocratic lobbies with a politics of national 
ressentiment.
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How can the persistent deformation of democratic principles 
in the financial regime be prevented? On the one hand, for a 
moment, good prospects had emerged in Europe after 2008: 
Big banks were voluntarily nationalized, solidarity movements 
were founded, and sound proposals were amassed concerning 
the long overdue coordination of monetary, fiscal and economic 
policy. But all that is a thing of the past: the separation of retail 
and investment banking demanded by all experts is only the 
most recent casualty. On the other hand, the financial regime has 
asserted its supremacy as an even more efficient combination of 
private value creation and the use of sovereign reserves of power. 
Therefore our pessimism today can hardly be great enough, that 
is to say: what is at stake is the intensification of a pessimist 
realism which mistrusts attempts at appeasement, which does 
not consider financial capitalism to be the best of all possible 
worlds, and which makes the power of the financial regime appear 
so illegitimate and unacceptable that it becomes accessible to 
interventions, contestations and struggles. This is not how we 
wish to be governed.
For the rule of the financial regime is: the sovereign is he, who 
can transform his risks into other’s dangers and position himself 
as the creditor of last resort.
182
1 Yanis Varoufakis, Adults in the Room: My Battle with the 
European and American Deep Establishment (New York: 
Farrar Straus and Giroux, 2017), 447.
2 See David Levi-Faur, “The Global Diffusion of Regulatory 
Capitalism,” The Annals of the American Academy of 
Political and Social Science 598, no. 1 (2016): 12-
32; Fabrizio Gilardi, “The Institutional Foundations of 
Regulatory Capitalism: The Diffusion of Independent 
Regulatory Agencies in Western Europe,” The Annals of 
the American Academy of Political and Social Science 
598, no. 1 (2016): 84-101.
3 Thomas Piketty, Le capital au XXIe siècle (Paris: Éditions 
du Seuil, 2013).
4 See Aaron Sahr, Keystroke-Kapitalismus. Ungleichheit 
auf Knopfdruck (Hamburg: Hamburger Edition, 2017), 
154.
NOTES
Joseph Vogl
